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ALTRUISM, MARKETS, AND ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT 
JULIA D. MAHONEY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For decades, the dominant view among biomedical ethicists, transplantation 
professionals, and the public at large has been that altruism, not financial 
considerations, should motivate organ donors. Proposals to compensate sources 
of transplantable organs or their survivors, although endorsed by a number of 
economists and legal scholars,1 have been denounced as unethical and 
impracticable.2 Organ transplantation is said to belong to the world of gift, as 
distinct from the market realm. Paying for organs would inject commerce into a 
sphere where market values have no place and would transform a system based 
on generosity and civic spirit into one of antiseptic, bargained-for exchanges.3 
Today, this long-standing commitment to altruistic procurement is under 
severe pressure. The growing understanding that organ transplantation is a 
lucrative business has spurred many to question a system that insists organ 
providers go unpaid while hospitals, physicians, and others reap financial 
returns.4 Moreover, the strict ban on compensation fits uneasily with the 
notion—widely embraced in the wake of the collapse of communism in Eastern 
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 1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE 219–36 (1997); A.H. Barnett et al., Improving Organ Donation: Compensation Versus Markets, 
29 INQUIRY 372 (1992); James F. Blumstein, The Case for Commerce in Organ Transplantation, 24 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2190 (1992); Lloyd Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Organs: The Virtues of 
a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 2. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. CAPLAN, AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? THE ETHICAL FRONTIERS OF 
BIOMEDICINE 95–96 (1997); NICHOLAS L. TILNEY, TRANSPLANT: FROM MYTH TO REALITY 267–74 
(2003). 
 3. See, e.g., Thomas Murray, Organ Vendors, Families and the Gift of Life, in ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES 120–23 (Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 1996); see also 
Gil Siegel & Richard Bonnie, Closing the Organ Gap: A Reciprocity-Based Social Contract Approach, 
34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 415, 415–16 (2006). 
 4. See MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 6–
20 (2006); Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 176–85 (2000). 
02_MAHONEY_BOOK PROOF.DOC 10/26/2009  1:49:45 PM 
18 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:17 
Europe and the former Soviet Union—that, as a general rule, market exchanges 
further social welfare.5 Most important, under the current system the gap 
between the supply and demand of transplantable organs shows little or no sign 
of abating.6 The failures or limited successes of “required request” laws 
mandating that families of potential organ providers be approached about 
donation, public-information campaigns, and other policy initiatives designed to 
remedy the organ shortage militate for aggressive exploration of all options, 
including financial rewards. 
This exploration is starting to take place. In the past five years, leading 
academic journals and university presses have published a stream of books and 
articles arguing that—at least in some circumstances—financial incentives for 
organ sources offer a morally acceptable and potentially effective means of 
augmenting the organ supply.7 Opinion pieces critical of the ban on 
compensation for organ providers now appear regularly in the mainstream 
press.8 And in testimony before Congress, a representative of the American 
Medical Association, an organization once implacably opposed to 
compensation, advocated further study of financial rewards for deceased 
donors.9 
The groundswell of interest in financial incentives brings into sharp relief 
the question whether the time has come to abandon the societal commitment to 
uncompensated organ procurement. The answer, I argue, is a tentative “yes.” 
 
 5. See generally MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE IDEAS THAT CONQUERED THE WORLD: PEACE, 
DEMOCRACY AND FREE MARKETS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004). 
 6. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 
1–3 (2006) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT] (demonstrating the “widening gap between 
the supply of transplantable organs and the number of patients on the waiting list” by examining the 
number of transplants and number of candidates on the waiting list from 1995 to 2004); Michele 
Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics and Private Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 600 (2007) 
(“The evidence, including growing waitlists and thousands of deaths each year, informs us that altruistic 
organ procurement remains an ineffective approach to meet the growing demand for organs.”). 
 7. See, e.g., MARK J. CHERRY, KIDNEY FOR SALE BY OWNER: HUMAN ORGANS, 
TRANSPLANTATION, AND THE MARKET (2005); JAMES STACEY TAYLOR, STAKES AND KIDNEYS: 
WHY MARKETS IN HUMAN BODY PARTS ARE MORALLY IMPERATIVE (2005); Abdallah S. Daar, The 
Case for a Regulated System of Living Kidney Sales, 2 NATURE CLINICAL PRAC. NEPHROLOGY 600 
(2006); Amy L. Friedman, Payments for Living Organ Donation Should Be Legalised, 33 BRIT. MED. J. 
746 (2006); Benjamin E. Hippen, In Defense of a Regulated Market in Kidneys from Living Vendors, 30 
J. MED. & PHIL. 593 (2005); Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (Vendor) 
Kidneys: A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216 (2004); A.P. Monaco, 
Rewards for Organ Donation: The Time Has Come, 69 KIDNEY INT’L 955 (2006); Robert M. Veatch, 
Why Liberals Should Accept Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 
19 (2003). 
 8. See, e.g., Consider Incentives to Boost Ranks of Organ Donors, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2003, at 
14A; Guy Darst, Organ of Change: Time to Allow Legal Kidney Sales, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 18, 
2007, at 023; Russell Korobkin, Sell an Organ, Save a Life?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at M5; Sally 
Satel, Death’s Waiting List, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006, at A21. 
 9. Assessing Incentives to Increase Organ Donations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 51 (2003) (statement of 
Robert M. Sade, Professor of Surgery, Medical University of South Carolina and Member, American 
Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs). 
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Caution is warranted not because the arguments marshaled against 
compensating organ donors are convincing: they are not. Rather, the need for 
deliberateness stems from the complex challenges of moving from a 
procurement system based on appeals to generosity to one that draws on a 
wider set of motivations. These challenges extend beyond overcoming or 
moderating the strong feelings of “repugnance” that the prospect of paying 
organ sources elicits in many.10 Providing compensation to organ sources would 
entail a substantial—possibly even a radical—overhaul of our current system of 
organ procurement, which is rooted in organizations and practices designed to 
coordinate and facilitate altruism.11 How easy it will be to graft financial 
incentives onto the existing system is as yet hard to assess.12 
I begin this article with a brief history of the restriction on payments to 
sources of transplantable organs. I then turn to the arguments commonly 
advanced against compensating organ sources and explain how they are 
grounded in beliefs that range from the highly contestable to the demonstrably 
wrong. Next, I address questions of institutional design, examining the most 
popular compensation proposals, and offering preliminary assessments of their 
promise and feasibility. I conclude with some thoughts about the relationship 
between altruism and self-interest. 
II 
PROHIBITIONS ON PAYMENTS TO ORGAN SOURCES: HISTORY AND 
BACKGROUND 
Although a modern technology, organ transplantation arouses primitive 
emotions.13 Incorporating parts of one person into another dissolves physical 
boundaries in a way that for most of human history was the stuff of myth and 
that contravenes customs and practices regarding treatment of the human 
body.14 Not surprisingly, organ transplantation has elicited complicated 
 
 10. See Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at 
37, 54 (detailing how “distaste for certain kinds of transactions can” constrain markets and urging 
“economists and other proponents of legalizing kidney sales” to pay careful attention to the “sources of 
repugnance” in crafting solutions to the organ shortage crisis); see also Leon Kass, Organs for Sale? 
Propriety, Property and the Price of Progress, PUB. INT., Spring 1992, at 65, 84 (examining “hard-to-
articulate intuitions and sensibilities” concerning organ sales). 
 11. See Kieran Healy, Altruism as an Organizational Problem: The Case of Organ Procurement, 69 
AM. SOC. REV. 387, 393 (2004) (explaining how the altruism associated with organ donation is “highly 
institutionalized” in that it is “structured, promoted, and made logistically possible by organizations and 
institutions with a strong interest in producing it”). 
 12. See id. at 400 (emphasizing the limits of our knowledge about “the dynamics of procurement 
over time or the way different parts of the organizational system interact with one another and with 
individual donors”). 
 13. See LESLEY A. SHARP, STRANGE HARVEST: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, DENATURED BODIES, 
AND THE TRANSFORMED SELF 1–2 (2006). 
 14. See Kass, supra note 10, at 73 (detailing the “presumptions and repugnances against treating 
the human body in the ways that are required for organ transplantation”). 
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reactions.15 Organ-procurement workers often struggle to convince organ 
sources and their next of kin to overcome what is for many a strong, instinctive 
aversion to organ harvest.16 That transplant professionals have substantially 
succeeded in recasting as socially acceptable and even laudable what in any 
other context would constitute desecration—or, in the case of living donors, 
physical battery—is a testament to their thoughtfulness and sensitivity.17 
The already fraught emotional climate surrounding organ transplantation is 
exacerbated by fears that the demand for transplantable organs could lead to 
the commodification of the human body, as “spare parts” are swapped for cash 
and other valuable consideration.18 Anxiety over the prospect of markets in 
human flesh helps explain Congress’s hasty passage in 1984 of the National 
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA).19 Enacted soon after a former physician 
announced plans to set up a company to broker human kidneys,20 NOTA makes 
it unlawful for any person to “knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer 
any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if 
the transfer affects interstate commerce.”21 Before NOTA’s passage, the legality 
of organ purchases from sources or their survivors was unclear, although the 
near-universal practice was that donors went unpaid.22 Transplantable organs 
were often, for all practical purposes, treated not as the property of the original 
holder or her survivors, but as that of the harvesting surgeons, who enjoyed 
broad powers to allocate organs based on their clinical and ethical judgments.23 
NOTA imposes a restriction on “valuable consideration,” but it is of limited 
scope. NOTA excepts “reasonable payments associated with the removal, 
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and 
 
 15. See SHARP, supra note 13, at 2 (“Organ transplantation indisputably generates an unusual 
combination of curiosity, celebration, and anxiety.”). 
 16. See id. at 56–73. 
 17. Cf. LESLEY A. SHARP, BODIES, COMMODITIES, AND BIOTECHNOLOGIES: DEATH, 
MOURNING AND SCIENTIFIC DESIRE IN THE REALM OF HUMAN ORGAN TRANSFER 51–52 (2007) 
(describing the work of procurement specialists). 
 18. See RENÉE C. FOX & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY 64–72 (1992) (discussing the debate in the 1980s between medical societies and 
health organizations arguing for proscription of organ commodification and public-policy analysts 
advocating compensation for donors of bodily parts). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2006). 
 20. See Margaret Engel, Virginia Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e). 
 22. See James F. Childress, The Body as Property: Some Philosophical Reflections, 24 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2143 (1992); Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for 
Human Organs, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 57–86 (James F. 
Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989). 
 23. See JEFFREY PROTTAS, THE MOST USEFUL GIFT: ALTRUISM AND THE PUBLIC POLICY OF 
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 148 (1994) (“[T]he use [of organs] was in the surgeons’ hands, and decisions 
regarding who received a transplant were dependent on the surgeons’ understanding of their ethical 
responsibilities to their patients and their technical views on clinical matters. What consistency there 
was . . . derived from the similarities of training and values to be found among transplant surgeons.”). 
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storage” of human organs.24 Moreover, NOTA has never been interpreted to 
limit the amount a hospital can charge a patient for a comprehensive package of 
goods and services that includes a new organ.25 In essence, the effect of NOTA’s 
compensation ban is to prohibit organ sources and their survivors from 
receiving payment in exchange for consenting to organ harvest, not to prohibit 
all transfers of organs in exchange for consideration. In short, NOTA prevents 
only the most-obvious commerce in organs. 
Along with restricting organ sales, NOTA effected major changes in organ 
procurement and allocation. NOTA established the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN) and charged the new organization with 
developing and administering a fair and equitable system of organ distribution.26 
Under the terms of the statute, this unified, national transplant network must 
be administered by a private, nonprofit entity under contract to the federal 
government. Since 1986, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a 
nonprofit organization based in Richmond, Virginia, has served as 
administrator of the OPTN.27 Under the system created by NOTA and overseen 
by UNOS, retrieval and transplantation of organs from deceased donors—who 
generate approximately seventy-seven percent of transplanted organs28—is 
coordinated by fifty-eight Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs), each of 
which ministers to a particular, assigned geographic area.29 The duties of OPOs 
include identifying potential organ donors, working with donor families to 
answer questions about and obtain consent for organ recovery, and overseeing 
the harvest and transportation of usable organs.30 OPOs also work to encourage 
organ donation—including living donation—through public-education 
campaigns.31 Through these activities, OPOs play an important role both in 
fomenting and shaping public perceptions of the meaning of organ donation.32 
The idea that consent to organ harvest constitutes a “gift of life” is a key theme 
 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e). 
 25. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 179–83. 
 26. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19–25. 
 27. United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
 28. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, National Data Reports, http://www.optn. 
org/latestData/step2.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
 29. Id.; see also David H. Howard, Producing Organ Donors, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at 25, 
26–27. 
 30. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 20–23. OPOs have significant financial 
motivations for maximizing the number of organs harvested in their assigned areas. See Joan 
McGregor, Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde, Recovery of Transplantable Organs After 
Cardiac or Circulatory Death: Transforming the Paradigm for the Ethics of Organ Donation, 2 PHIL. 
ETHICS & HUMAN. MED. 8, 11 (2007). 
 31. See KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN BLOOD 
AND ORGANS 43–44 (2006). 
 32. See id. at 17 (detailing how blood- and organ-procurement organizations “create and sustain 
their donor pools by providing opportunities to give and by producing and popularizing accounts of 
what giving means”). 
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of OPO communications and is credited with helping to overcome public 
hesitation about organ donation.33 
III 
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROHIBITING SOURCE COMPENSATION 
According to NOTA’s legislative history, Congress’s decision to restrict 
organ sales stemmed from a conviction that human body parts must not become 
commodities used to generate profits.34 Whether Congress failed to grasp that 
NOTA’s prohibitions would fall short of totally eliminating commerce in 
organs, or whether it simply made a pragmatic choice based on its judgment 
that popular opinion equated compensation for sources with commerce in 
organs, is uncertain. What is clear is that anticommodification rhetoric was front 
and center in the deliberations over NOTA. The likely consequences of 
commercial activity in organs, legislators averred, were dire. The Report of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives 
concluded, “[T]here is strong evidence to suggest that permitting the sale of 
human organs might result in the collapse of the nation’s system of voluntary 
organ donation.”35 Noting that congressional investigation of the nation’s system 
of organ procurement had uncovered a “number of instances of individuals 
promoting the sale of kidneys between unrelated donors,” the Report cautioned 
that, even though “it does not appear that any transactions have taken 
place[,] . . . the mere existence of such proposals threatens the voluntary 
donation system.”36 Congress was also influenced by expert testimony that 
bodily materials purchased from sources posed greater health hazards than ones 
acquired through gift.37 
Although support for restrictions on payments to sources has recently begun 
to wane, such restrictions have been vigorously defended since NOTA’s 
enactment. Foes of financial incentives echo the findings and concerns 
articulated by Congress in its consideration of NOTA: to pay organ sources 
would inappropriately convert human body parts into objects of commerce; the 
availability of compensation could drive out donations, reducing both the level 
of altruism in society and the supply of organs; and organs obtained by payment 
are less safe than donated ones. Opponents also express fears that paying 
sources will increase the already high cost of transplantation and exploit the 
poor and otherwise vulnerable.38 
 
 33. See id. at 25 (“[O]pposition to commodification can be traced in part to successful efforts to 
convince the public that organ donation is a morally worthwhile act.”). 
 34. S. REP. NO. 98–382, at 2, 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976, 3978. 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 98–575, at 22–23 (1983). 
 36. Id. 
 37. National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the 
Environment of H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 299 (1983) (statement of Bernard 
Towers, Professor of Anatomy, Pediatrics and Psychiatry, UCLA Medical School). 
 38. See infra III.D–E. 
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Yet upon examination, none of these arguments justifies a blanket 
prohibition on financial incentives. Transplantable organs are already valuable 
commodities, bought and sold for large sums; there is scant evidence that 
payments to organ sources would crowd out altruistic transfers; and the refusal 
to compensate sources of human biological materials is a poor proxy for safety. 
Payments to organ sources, far from being automatically tacked on to 
recipients’ medical charges, might actually reduce transplant costs. Finally, to 
assume that compensated organ sources are prone to exploitation while 
uncompensated sources are not is to fail to grasp the complexity of gift and 
market transactions. 
A. The Unsuitability of Commerce 
Those who object to financial rewards tend to characterize the existing 
regime as one of donative transfers and to suggest that compensation for organ 
sources is inconsistent with the reigning “gift model.”39 But to frame the debate 
over financial incentives in terms of whether organs will become commodities is 
to misunderstand how organ transplantation operates. However appealing the 
idea that generous impulses propel transplantable organs from original 
possessor to ultimate recipient, the reality is that organs are continually 
exchanged for valuable consideration. Only the first link in the distribution 
chain is a gratuitous transferwhen the individual source agrees to make a 
solid organ available for transplant. Subsequent transfers generally entail the 
exchange of valuable consideration for rights to possess, use, and exclude others 
from organs.40 Thus transplant programs pay organ-procurement organizations 
for exclusive rights to organs, and then bundle the acquired body parts with 
medical services for sale to patients, often at the maximum price the market will 
bear.41 Although the claim is sometimes advanced that any payments made are 
for services rendered, not for the actual organs, this distinction makes no sense. 
No one would pay for organ transportation or transplant services that fail to 
include an organ, just as there is no market for “dining services” that do not 
include food.42 
Refusing to compensate sources means not that organs are not commodities, 
but that commodification begins after the initial transfer of rights.43 Put baldly, 
the mix of both compensated and uncompensated transfers in the organ-
distribution chain results in a curious system in which a precious resource that 
 
 39. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12; see also MURRAY, supra note 3, at 120–
23. 
 40. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 180–84 (arguing that organs become marketable goods after 
donation and are then sold to patients “as part of an indivisible package” by transplant programs). 
 41. See A.H. BARNETT & DAVID KASERMAN, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A 
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 89–98 (2002). 
 42. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 182–83. 
 43. Id.; see also SHARP, supra note 13, at 50 (“There is a national trade in transplantable human 
organs in the United States and, once procured, organs are most certainly transformed into precious 
commodities.”). 
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starts out as a gift becomes an object of exchange. But far from being adjudged 
illegal or immoral, purchases and sales of organs by procurement organizations, 
hospitals, and other institutions engaged in transplantation are uncontroversial. 
On first impression, this placid acceptance is baffling. If commercial activity in 
human organs is so objectionable, why is the policy debate devoid of discussion 
about how to stop it? A moment’s consideration yields the answer: To end 
commerce in organs would require a complete transformation of the 
distribution network so that nothing of value is exchanged for rights to possess 
or use organs. Simply put, the distribution system could be comprised of 
nothing but gratuitous transfers. Not even the most fervent opponent of 
commerce in organs has endorsed such a departure from established practice. 
Instead, trafficking in organs is tacitly accepted, and the sound and fury of the 
debate over organ sales is directed at whether the first transfer of property 
rights ought to be a donation or a sale.44 
The absence of serious proposals to shut down commerce in transplantable 
organs is both telling and poignant. Notwithstanding the distaste and disgust the 
idea of profiting from human biological materials stirs, it is a truth universally 
grasped—just not universally acknowledged—that forces of altruism alone are 
unlikely to deliver organs to all those in critical need of transplants. The 
inadequacy of altruism is due not only to a paucity of individual selflessness—
although it is hard to envision hospitals, physicians, and others who profit from 
the organ business foregoing remuneration altogether—but to the formidable 
information and coordination problems inherent in the organization of altruistic 
activities.45 
B. Would Financial Incentives Crowd Out Donations? 
One response to the claim that organ sales are inevitable is that even if a 
system devoid of the taint of market activity lies beyond our capabilities, surely 
we prefer more generosity to less. Under this reasoning, a distribution chain 
made up of a first, altruistic link followed by bargained-for exchanges is 
superior to one in which money changes hands at every stage. If this is correct, 
then payments to organ sources would cause societal harm if sales “crowd out” 
donations, leading those who would have made organs available for free to 
insist on compensation.46 To be convincing, however, this line of argument 
would have to justify its assumption that more altruism is necessarily preferable 
 
 44. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 183–85 (explaining how the market functions in the distribution of 
corneas). 
 45. Cf. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis, in 
ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATIONS 3–4 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998) 
(describing the difficulties of establishing and maintaining nonmarket resource-distribution networks). 
 46. See Gabriel M. Danovitch & Alan B. Leichtman, Kidney Vending: The “Trojan Horse” of 
Organ Transplantation, 1 CLIN. J. AM. SOC. NEPHROLOGY 1133–35 (2006). 
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to less. Yet this assumption ignores the distributional and other consequences 
of acts of altruism.47 
A more extreme version of the “crowding out” argument—one which 
Congress articulated in its deliberations over NOTA48—posits that the 
availability of financial incentives might so disturb potential donors that many 
will refuse to allow their organs to be harvested.49 Should that occur, introducing 
financial incentives would cause not just inchoate, hard-to-measure harms such 
as a reduction in generous sentiments in society, but also catastrophic loss of life 
and damage to health. Opponents of financial incentives have invoked the 
specter of a plunge in the organ supply as reason to refuse to undertake even 
preliminary pilot programs.50 
The chief problem with the “crowding out” line of argument is that—as 
even its proponents admit—it is highly speculative.51 Evidence suggests that in 
certain circumstances, offering rewards and punishments to encourage prosocial 
behavior can backfire. That is, in some instances the presence of extrinsic 
motivations can erode the willingness of individuals to provide goods or engage 
in (or refrain from) particular actions.52 At the same time, there is also evidence 
that in certain circumstances, external intervention can “crowd in” intrinsic 
motivation—indeed, the notion that incentives fuel internal motivation enjoyed 
wide currency in western thought in the sixteenth through nineteenth 
centuries.53 Finally, it is entirely plausible that in many contexts, external 
rewards and penalties will, as standard neoclassical economic theory predicts, 
have no effect on intrinsic motivation.54 Whether a particular reward will 
 
 47. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 216–18. 
 48. See supra II. 
 49. See, e.g., Jeffrey Prottas, Buying Human Organs—Evidence That Money Doesn’t Change 
Everything, 53 TRANSPLANTATION 1371 (1992); see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 
6, at 11 (“[T]he relationship between financial payments and a willingness to donate may not conform 
to the pattern that applies to ordinary consumer goods; payments may ‘crowd out’ other motivations, 
and some families who would donate under an altruistic system may refuse to donate.”). 
 50. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 243 (“[I]f organ donation were to 
become ‘commercialized’ because of the use of payments, some families who are willing to donate 
under an altruistic system may refuse to provide consent . . . .”); id. at 259 (recommending against “the 
use of financial incentives to increase the supply of transplantable organs . . . at this time”). 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 243 (acknowledging the lack of “scientific research bearing on the possibility that 
legitimizing financial payments will crowd out nonfinancial motivations for organ donation or on 
whether the problem could be reduced in a carefully regulated market”); Sheila Rothman & David 
Rothman, The Hidden Cost of Organ Sale, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1524, 1525 (2006) (cataloging 
experiments in which a crowding-out effect was found and conceding that “[n]one of these exercises are 
without important methodological weaknesses”). 
 52. See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AMER. ECON. REV. 
1652, 1654 (2006). 
 53. See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL 
MOTIVATION 24–25 (1997). 
 54. Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043, 1044 
(1997); see also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL 
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 93–113 (1977) (detailing how Adam Smith’s 
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“crowd out,” “crowd in,” or have a “crowding neutral” effect on internal 
motivation is hard to predict. 
The challenge of drawing on studies of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is 
compounded by the fact that most situations in which researchers have detected 
“crowding out” differ markedly from organ procurement. Well-known 
examples of “crowding out” include a Swiss community where a proposal to 
establish a nuclear-waste repository contingent on compensating all residents 
garnered less support than a proposal to establish an identical facility without 
compensation,55 an Israeli day-care center where the imposition of small fines 
for late pick-ups resulted in more failures to collect children on time,56 and a 
study of teenagers who solicited funds for disabled children, in which unpaid 
subjects outperformed paid ones.57 It is unclear whether and to what degree we 
can extrapolate from these situations to organ donation. One recent study of 
Swedish, potential blood donors found, interestingly, a “crowding out” effect 
for women but not for men.58 To date, this finding has not been replicated. 
Moreover, even with fact patterns that bear some resemblance to organ 
procurement, difficult questions arise concerning the relevance of the findings 
to other situations and cultures.59 Until far more work is done, “crowding out” 
must remain an interesting, but unconvincing, hypothesis. Although we cannot 
dismiss it out of hand, in no way does the available evidence for “crowding out” 
point to the conclusion that sweeping bans on donor compensation are sensible 
policy. 
C. Safety Concerns 
The conviction that unpaid donors are safer sources of human tissue than 
compensated ones gained wide currency in the early 1970s, when Richard 
Titmuss published his seminal work, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood 
to Social Policy. Comparing the blood-collection systems of the United States 
and Great Britain, The Gift Relationship argued that the American practice of 
using blood obtained from paid donors had deleterious health consequences for 
blood recipients.60 Over the next two decades, a number of studies appeared 
that lent credence to Titmuss’s assertion: paid blood sources admitted to more 
risky behaviors and were infected with blood-borne diseases at a higher rate 
 
vision of human motivation diverged from those of earlier thinkers who argued that monetary 
incentives improved intrinsic motivation). 
 55. Frey, supra note 53, at 1047–48. 
 56. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–8 (2000). 
 57. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 792, 799–800 
(2000). 
 58. Carl Mellstrom & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss 
Right?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 845, 852–54 (2008). 
 59. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of Organ 
Transplantation, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 478–79 (2008). 
 60. RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 
142–57 (1970). 
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than unpaid ones, and purchased blood was found to be more likely to transmit 
hepatitis.61 
But the safety question is a complicated one. For one thing, the failure to 
pay sources is not a reliable proxy for human-tissue quality. Carefully chosen 
and monitored groups of paid donors have yielded safe blood, while voluntary 
donors have acted as vectors for HIV.62 Indeed, far from serving as a guarantor 
of public welfare, the devotion of the U.S. blood industry to unpaid donors—a 
policy instituted in the wake of The Gift Relationship—contributed to the 
nation’s slow response to the emerging threat of AIDS.63 Another consideration 
in assessing the safety implications of compensating organs sources is that if 
financial incentives lead to a sufficient jump in the organ supply, transplant 
programs will have more latitude to reject less-desirable organs. As a result, the 
overall quality of transplanted organs could increase, resulting in health benefits 
for organ recipients.64 
D. Compensating Organ Sources and the Cost of Transplants 
The claim that financial incentives will raise the cost of transplants flows 
from the assumption that money or other valuable consideration offered to 
organ sources constitutes an additional expense, one that will inevitably be 
passed on to transplant recipients.65 By raising the price of an already expensive 
procedure, the argument goes, compensation for organ sources would place 
intolerable financial burdens on critically ill patients and possibly even reduce 
access to transplants. 
This line of thinking is flawed. First, paying organ sources may prove a 
cheaper means of procuring organs than soliciting donations. Under the current 
system, substantial sums are devoted to public-information campaigns and 
other efforts to persuade potential donors to consent to organ harvest.66 With 
financial incentives to donate, these “exhortation” costs will in all likelihood 
fall. Whether the decline in exhortation costs will offset the total amount of 
compensation paid is an empirical question, of course, but the key point is that 
right now organ procurement is not cheap, even though organ sources go 
unpaid. Second, far from making transplants less affordable, financial incentives 
could decrease the cost of transplants. If financial rewards alleviate the organ 
 
 61. See Julia D. Mahoney & Pamela Clark, Property Rights in Human Tissue, in PROPERTY 
RIGHTS DYNAMICS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 144 (Donatella Porrini & Giovanni 
Ramello eds., 2007). 
 62. HEALY, supra note 31, at 87–109. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See A.H. Barnett, R.D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Improving Organ Donation: 
Compensation Versus Markets, 29 INQUIRY 178, 376 (1992). 
 65. Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Financial Incentives, 269 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 3113, 3116–17 (1993); Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in 
Body Parts, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 262 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994). 
 66. See Emanuel D. Thorne, The Cost of Procuring Market-Inalienable Human Organs, 10 J. REG. 
ECON. 191, 194–95 (1996). 
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shortage, competition among transplant programs can be expected to increase, 
as patients will have greater ability to choose among rival programs.67 One likely 
avenue of competition is price. An increase in the supply of organs might also 
enable transplant programs to operate more efficiently, leading to cost 
reductions that could translate into consumer savings. Finally, even if monetary 
incentives do increase the total cost of transplantation procedures, the 
magnitude of the increase may be relatively modest.68 
E. Exploitation of the Vulnerable 
For all their recognized advantages, markets generate unease. It is feared 
that bargained-for exchanges might lead not to mutual gain, but to the 
flourishing of the strong either at the expense of the weak or with no 
concomitant benefit for them. Such worries are especially acute in the area of 
organ sales. Individuals willing to accept cash or other valuable consideration 
for solid organs—particularly their own—might be in desperate financial or 
emotional straits. To protect the vulnerable, many argue, the law should 
prevent people from selling their organs, just as it protects workers—at least 
some of the time—from dangerous, degrading, or extremely low-paid 
occupational conditions. Advocates of freedom of contract disagree, and point 
out that constraining the choices of prospective organ sellers might hurt rather 
than help them.69 But even opponents of compensation bans are, in general, 
hard-pressed to defend organ sales in ringing terms. 
By contrast, gifts of organs tend to elicit favorable reactions. In the case of 
organs obtained from the dead, donations are lauded as noble acts of 
selflessness that allow something good to emerge from tragedy. Harvesting the 
organs of deceased donors not only saves lives, but serves as a means of 
memorializing the dead and comforting the bereaved.70 Attitudes toward living 
donation are less rhapsodic, but still positive. Though it is recognized that 
subjecting a healthy individual to significant short-term and long-term risks 
raises grave ethical questions, both the transplant community and the broader 
public support procuring organs from living donors.71 Many reform proposals 
for living-donor practices call for improvements within the process of obtaining 
informed consent and for more extensive studies of medical and other 
consequences—but not for halting the use of living donors altogether.72 
 
 67. BARNETT & KASERMAN, supra note 41, at 20–23. 
 68. See Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elias, Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and 
Cadaveric Organ Donations, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at 3, 3 (concluding that financial incentive 
schemes could “eliminate the large queues in the organ market . . . while increasing the overall cost of 
transplant surgery by no more than about 12 percent”). 
 69. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 34–36 (1994). 
 70. HEALY, supra note 31, at 27–35. 
 71. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 263–77. 
 72. Id. at 270–77. 
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Yet the assumption that offering to compensate organ sources necessarily 
entails a greater danger of exploitation than soliciting donations is unfounded. 
Both market and donative relationships exhibit great complexity, running the 
full gamut from the mutually beneficial to the disempowering. It is wrong to 
think that knowing whether a transfer of goods or services is paid or gratuitous 
gives us full information about its meaning for those involved. Bargained-for 
exchanges may forge interpersonal connections and solidify social 
relationships—even intimate relationships.73 Acts of charity, on the other hand, 
may underscore gaps in status and capabilities, creating or widening distances 
between donors and recipients. In calculating risks of exploitation, it makes 
sense to focus on the capacities and expectations of the partieswhat 
information is conveyed and howand the organization and operation of 
mediating institutions.74 Only then are we in a good position to judge the effects 
of various regimes on organ sources. 
Applied to the current system, such scrutiny stirs disquiet. Prospective organ 
sources—some of whom would have a hard time obtaining transplants were 
they in need, due to the “green screen” that can impede transplant access for 
the insolvent and uninsured—are encouraged to donate so that organ-
procurement organizations, hospitals, and others can reap financial rewards. 
This practice would be worrisome enough if donors were fully apprised of the 
extent to which their gifts can generate financial bonanzas. That the information 
furnished fails to disclose how lucrative the transplant business is only 
compounds the unattractiveness of denying organ sources compensation while 
neither urging nor expecting similar generosity from the others involved. 
There is another, subtler concern. The insistence on altruistic procurement 
means that potential organ sources confront a stark choice: donate or refuse to 
help save a life. This constricted set of options is an anomaly in the realm of 
charitable activity. In other contexts, individuals are afforded latitude to 
balance altruistic projects—an important part of most lives—with the pursuit of 
other goals.75 Thus a doctor may devote ten hours per week to treating the 
indigent, just as the owner of a valuable painting may sell it to a museum for 
less than the full market price. In neither case is the prospective altruist forced 
either to give more than she feels capable of giving or not to give at all. Organ 
sources are denied this freedom, even though it would be wholly 
 
 73. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 3 (2005) (rejecting the view that 
“public policy must insulate household relations, personal care, and love . . . from an invading, 
predatory, economic world” and analyzing “how all of us use economic activity to create, strengthen, 
and renegotiate important ties”); see also Luke Dauter & Neil Fligstein, The Sociology of Markets, 33 
ANN. REV. SOC. 105, 113 (2007) (detailing how many “market actors are involved in day-to-day social 
relationships with one another, relationships built on trust, friendship, power and dependence”). 
 74. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 65 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 203, 211–31 (2008) (analyzing the interests and incentives of participants in markets for 
parental rights). 
 75. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 215–20; see also Julia D. Mahoney, Should We Adopt a Market 
Strategy to Increase the Supply of Transplantable Organs?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION 73–76 (Wayne Shelton & John Balint eds., 2001). 
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understandable for a prospective donor to prefer that his organs be made 
available for transplant upon his death and that his survivors receive 
compensation. 
Insisting that organ sources either act out of pure altruism or forego 
donation altogether raises particularly difficult issues when applied to living 
donors. Although laws and regulations sometimes prohibit workers from 
undertaking vocational risks, in a number of other contexts, individuals are 
permitted to take dangerous jobs and to receive a “risk premium” on top of 
normal wages as compensation for the perils they face.76 What is unheard of is to 
refuse to pay workers for dangerous work, but to urge that they do it for free 
instead on the grounds that their sacrifices would generate social value. Yet 
this, in effect, is precisely what we pressure living donors to agree to. Denied 
the chance to both do good by helping others and do well by enriching 
themselves, prospective donors must choose from a truncated and 
unsatisfactory menu. 
IV 
INSTITUTIONS AND COMPLEX MOTIVATIONS 
That the arguments for refusing to compensate organ sources are 
unpersuasive does not mean that instituting financial rewards would necessarily 
prove to be a good policy choice. Introducing financial incentives raises 
significant challenges, not least among them overcoming the potential hostility 
of procurement professionals, bioethicists, and others who fiercely espouse the 
principle of altruistic donation. Compounding such resistance are formal and 
informal constraints on financial incentives.77 Removing, modifying, or declining 
to enforce the formal constraints—that is, the laws and regulations prohibiting 
compensation for organ sources—will not automatically dissolve the informal 
constraints of organizational practice and social norms. 
That said, there is reason to suspect that informal institutional limits on 
financial incentives are malleable.78 At the very least, some forms of financial 
incentives might prove both effective and acceptable. But, in assessing potential 
institutional modifications, we are hampered by our limited knowledge of how 
societal attitudes change. Another stumbling block is our rudimentary 
understanding of the organizational framework that encourages and supports 
altruism in the context of organ donation.79 
 
 76. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912, 
1913–14 (1993). 
 77. Cf. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 4 (1990) (distinguishing between formal institutions consisting of “rules that humans 
devise” and informal institutions such as “conventions and codes of behavior”). 
 78. See SHARP, supra note 13, at 244 (examining the culture of organ procurement and suggesting 
that “the bedrock of an assumed gift economy has already eroded”). 
 79. See Healy, supra note 11, at 387–90. 
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It is worthwhile to examine the four most prominent financial-incentive 
proposals and assess their feasibility. Any such analysis is necessarily 
preliminary, for the long-standing, strict proscriptions against compensating 
organ sources make it hard to predict how procurement organizations and 
professionals, prospective donors, the general public, and others will react to 
policy innovations.80 
A. Rewarded Gifts  
One approach to introducing financial incentives is to provide compensation 
but claim that the donative framework remains intact.81 Instead of being labeled 
a “sale,” a transaction that involves the exchange of something valuable for 
consent to organ harvest will be termed a “gift,” albeit a rewarded one. By 
avoiding the language of the market, or so the reasoning goes, this approach 
will allow both the transplant community and the general public to regard 
compensating organ sources as a slight modification of current procedure rather 
than as a substantial innovation. Careful word choice will thus enable financial 
rewards to gain acceptance by salving the feelings of those who are put off by 
the notion of body parts as commodities. In this context—as in so many 
others—euphemism can function as a social emollient. 
This scheme has the powerful advantage of requiring the least institutional 
modification. Organ Procurement Organizations, hospital staff, and others 
involved in obtaining consent to harvest deceased organs could continue to 
solicit “gifts of life” in much the same way as before. Public-service campaigns 
and other efforts to encourage living organ donation could proceed largely 
unchanged. 
At the same time, “rewarded gift” proposals stir serious misgivings. For one 
thing, characterizing as a gift what may fairly be described as a sale is 
disingenuous, if not outright deceptive. In recent decades, medicine has claimed 
to embrace the values of truthfulness, fair dealing, and transparency.82 A 
method of organ procurement that entails anything less than full disclosure of 
all material facts is in profound tension with these ideals. There are practical 
dangers as well. If prospective donors and the public reject the distinction 
between “an incentive of material value and a payment for organs,”83 the upshot 
could be serious reputational harm for the transplant profession with no 
concomitant benefit of increasing the organ supply. 
Finally, if potential donors do believe that what is on offer is in fact a gift 
rather than a sale, the “rewarded gift” approach may fail to increase the organ 
 
 80. See Howard, supra note 29, at 30–32. 
 81. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 247–48 (detailing proposals to offer 
financial rewards that are intended to “function within the gift model” and to avoid undermining the 
belief that “organs are donated rather than sold”). 
 82. See generally THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS (2001). 
 83. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 248. 
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supply. The reason to supplement opportunities to donate with financial 
rewards, after all, is to tap into various human motivations: just as altruists will 
not respond to offers of payment, so nonaltruists cannot be expected to be 
moved by appeals to generosity.84 But if nonaltruists fail to grasp that what is 
offered is in fact compensation—not just another chance to be generous—they 
will not respond. 
B. Designated Compensation 
Another option—one that, like the “rewarded gift” approach, aims to 
realize the benefits of financial rewards while keeping at bay an obvious, full-
blown market in solid organs—is to require that compensation be devoted to 
particular purposes. Stipends for funeral expenses and donations to charity have 
been suggested as appropriate uses for money paid to organ sources.85 Other 
forms of compensation, including payment of medical expenses or insurance 
premiums, are also possibilities. 
Designated compensation is, in some respects, promising. Members of the 
transplant community and broader public who are uncomfortable with 
unrestricted cash payments for organs may find designated-compensation 
schemes more palatable, simply because (in their minds) some good 
consequences are guaranteed to flow from the transactions. In addition, 
designated compensation might be deemed unobjectionable—or less 
objectionable than unconstrained compensation—on the grounds that the 
motives of those receiving the money are more admirable than the motives of 
those willing to accept flat-out payment. Individuals who have pledged to 
devote the proceeds to health, education, or the burials of loved ones inspire 
sympathy and respect in a way that those free to spend the money to drink and 
gamble do not. Another possible benefit of designated compensation is its 
effect on potential donors. It is plausible—although of course uncertain—that a 
significant fraction of donors who hesitate to accept unrestricted funds would 
agree to make organs available if it is clear to others (and also, possibly, 
themselves) that they will use the money for socially admired purposes. 
There are drawbacks to designated compensation. First, the conceptual and 
logistical challenges are daunting. What considerations will determine what the 
recipients of compensation may spend the money on? What measures will 
organizations charged with administering payment programs take to ensure that 
funds are not diverted to unapproved uses? What remedies will be invoked if 
recipients of funds fail to comply with conditions? It seems unlikely that 
organizations that dispense funds would be willing to sue recipients. As yet, 
these and other hard questions remain for the most part unaddressed. Another 
 
 84. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 349–51 (1972). 
 85. See L.A. Siminoff & M.D. Leonard, Financial Incentives: Alternatives to the Altruistic Model of 
Organ Donation, 9 J. TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 250, 253 (1999); see also Howard, supra note 29, at 
31 (“The form and presentation of payment can help to mitigate against crowding out of altruistic 
donations.”). 
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concern is that designated compensation might be construed as suggesting that 
organ sources and their survivors cannot be trusted to make sound decisions 
about how to spend money. If that is correct, then limiting compensation to 
particular uses risks insulting organ sources. 
C. Unrestricted Payments for Organs from Deceased Donors 
A more controversial proposal is to offer unrestricted payments for organs 
of deceased donors. Funds could be disbursed directly to survivors or to the 
decedent’s estate and distributed in accordance with testamentary instructions 
or applicable intestacy laws. Alternately, living individuals could sell rights to 
harvest organs upon death, in the event they are eligible donors.86 In any case, 
recipients would be free to use the money for any purpose. 
Unlike rewarded gifts or designated compensation, this approach does not 
skirt the issue whether the first link of the organ distribution chain will include 
commercial activity. As such, unrestricted payments to deceased donors have 
the virtue of honesty. The transparency of the significant shift in social practice 
has the added benefit of signaling to potential donors that compensation is now 
on offer. Consequently, this approach may be a highly effective means of 
incentivizing nonaltruists to make organs available for transplant. It is also 
possible that this approach will meet with public approval on fairness grounds. 
Recent stories in the mainstream media about transfers of human biological 
materials have detailed how, in many transactions involving human tissue, 
everyone but the human source profits.87 If these narratives take hold in the 
public consciousness, then extending the opportunities to share in the financial 
gains made possible by organ harvest may strike many as simple justice. Above 
all, straightforward economic analysis indicates that monetary incentives would 
increase the organ supply.88 
But for all its appeal, the unrestricted-payment approach carries significant 
hazards. Vociferous and long-standing insistence that organ transplantation 
operates entirely within the “gift model” may lead procurement professionals 
and others who promote donation to resist the transition to a regime that 
solicits both donations and sales. To be sure, such a transition is by no means 
inconceivable, especially in light of the fact that other nonprofit organizations—
for example, art museums—both purchase and receive invaluable goods as 
donations. But although the culture of organ procurement is in many respects 
one of change and innovation,89 it is impossible to say with confidence what the 
reaction would be. 
 
 86. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 32–36. 
 87. See, e.g., Jeremy Laurance, Surgeon: Organ Trade Should Be Legalised, THE INDEPENDENT, 
June 13, 2008, at 10. 
 88. See Becker & Elias, supra note 68, at 9 (concluding that payments would “help close the gap 
between [the] quantity supplied and [the] quantity demanded” of organs). 
 89. See SHARP, supra note 13, at 242 (describing the shifts in “labels, rhetorical phrases, and 
attitudes” among procurement workers). 
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Even if transplant professionals come to embrace payments for organs, the 
problem of popular acceptance remains, for the “gift paradigm” might exert a 
strong hold on the public mind.90 Should public support fail to materialize, it is 
by no means certain that efforts by government entities or procurement 
organizations to inculcate it will succeed. If nothing else, our experience with 
information campaigns aimed at convincing the public to become organ donors 
has taught us that modifying preferences is no easy task.91 Finally, we cannot 
dismiss as preposterous the warnings of adherents of the “crowding out” 
hypothesis, that explicit payments could trigger such a backlash that prospective 
sources would refuse to donate—let alone sell—organs, decimating the organ 
supply.92 Although the probability of such a catastrophe is unlikely to be very 
high, policymakers may be unwilling to chance it. 
D. Unrestricted Compensation for Living Donors 
Allowing unrestricted compensation for living donors has many of the same 
advantages as unrestricted payments for deceased organs, most notably, frank 
acknowledgement of the departure from the gift framework and a solid 
likelihood of motivating a substantial number of nonaltruists to make organs 
available.93 Also in common with payments for organs acquired from the dead, 
compensating living donors may fail to increase the organ supply due to lack of 
enthusiasm among transplant workers and the general public—or even have the 
perverse effect of reducing the organ supply. 
There are some key differences. Living organ sources are subject to physical 
and mental health risks, many of which are of uncertain character and 
magnitude.94 If the availability of compensation boosts the number of living 
donors—which, after all, is its goal—the result will be more death and disability 
among organ sources. Living donors may also suffer the detrimental financial 
consequences of lost wages and trouble obtaining affordable health and 
disability insurance.95 Moreover, the negative consequences of living donation 
extend beyond harms to donors. Physicians and other health-care workers often 
suffer due to the ethical quandaries posed by operating on healthy individuals. 
However worthy the motivation for removing organs from living donors, 
surgery that is not intended to help the patient conflicts with the primum non 
nocere (first do no harm) principle.96 Compensating living donors does have one 
 
 90. See Howard, supra note 29, at 30–32. 
 91. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 187–99 (recounting the limited success 
of efforts to increase altruism). 
 92. See supra III.B. 
 93. See Becker & Elias, supra note 68, at 21–22. 
 94. See J.R. Inglefinger, Risks and Benefits to the Living Donor, 353 N. ENG. J. MED. 447, 447 
(2005) (stating that although physical and emotional risks for the living donor remain, the risks are now 
better understood). 
 95. See R.S. Brown & M.W. Russo, Financial Impact of Adult Living Donation, 9 (10) LIVER 
TRANSPLANTATION (SUPPLEMENT 1) S12, S14 (2003). 
 96. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 263–64. 
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distinct advantage over payments for deceased organs, though: it does not 
contravene the strong social norms against profiting from the sale of the corpses 
of loved ones. 
Implementing a system of compensation for living donors would in some 
respects be simple. Already, those in need of organs and potential organ 
providers generally deal directly with one another in arranging for altruistic 
transfer. For the most part, these nonmediated arrangements involve donors 
and recipients who are closely related, although some pair strangers with 
recipients whose plight is publicized through social-networks’ media stories or 
internet appeals.97 To add the option of payment would not require the 
cooperation of any of the organizations that operate as facilitators and 
fomenters of altruism. Compensation for living donors would, however, entail 
the elimination or non-enforcement of formal restrictions, as well as the 
revision of social norms. These norms are particularly strong in the context of 
familial and intimate relationships, in which explicit, bargained-for exchanges 
are often viewed as problematic.98 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Formal restrictions on financial incentives for organ sources were put in 
place decades ago. Imposed in haste and without careful analysis of the 
complexities of gift and market relationships, these prohibitions have long been 
justified as measures to prevent the commodification of the human body, to 
protect public health, and to shield the vulnerable from exploitation. In fact, 
bans on payments to organ sources accomplish none of these goals. Instead, the 
stubborn commitment to wholly altruistic procurement has resulted in a curious 
system, one in which individuals are exhorted to donate rights to valuable goods 
that are then sold to generate profits for others. 
The weaknesses in the arguments for refusing to pay organ sources suggest 
that the system is ripe for transformation. But here we must tread carefully, for 
changing organ transplantation entails more than revising formal laws and 
regulations. Also vital are the constraints imposed by social custom and 
organizational practice. Our understanding of how these constraints evolve—
much less how to foster societal and institutional transformation—is as yet 
limited. 
 
 
 97. The vast majority of living donors are family members of recipients. See Organ Procurement 
and Transplant Network, 2007 Annual Report of the OPTN and SRTR, available at http://www.optn. 
org/data/annualReport.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
 98. See generally ZELIZER, supra note 73. 
